Deductive-nomological model - Revision history

Bacchus: Text replacement - "tbe " to "the "

2024-04-29T00:19:01Z

Text replacement - "tbe " to "the "

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:19, 28 April 2024
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	The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, ~~tbe~~ Hempel–Oppenheim model, ~~tbe~~ Popper–Hempel model, or ~~tbe~~ covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". ~~tbe~~ DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of ~~tbe~~ phenomenon to be explained.		The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, the Hempel–Oppenheim model, the Popper–Hempel model, or the covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". the DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of the phenomenon to be explained.

	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of ~~tbe~~ DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive ~~tbe~~ phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, ~~tbe~~ DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of the DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive the phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, the DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in ~~tbe~~ 1960s, ~~tbe~~ DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In ~~tbe~~ early 1980s, a revision to ~~tbe~~ DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of ~~tbe~~ conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], ~~tbe~~ DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in the 1960s, the DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In the early 1980s, a revision to the DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of the conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], the DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Text replacement - " the " to " tbe "

2024-04-26T17:21:13Z

Text replacement - " the " to " tbe "

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:21, 26 April 2024
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	The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, ~~the~~ Hempel–Oppenheim model, ~~the~~ Popper–Hempel model, or ~~the~~ covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". ~~the~~ DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of ~~the~~ phenomenon to be explained.		The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, tbe Hempel–Oppenheim model, tbe Popper–Hempel model, or tbe covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". tbe DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of tbe phenomenon to be explained.

	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of ~~the~~ DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive ~~the~~ phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, ~~the~~ DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of tbe DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive tbe phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, tbe DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in ~~the~~ 1960s, ~~the~~ DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In ~~the~~ early 1980s, a revision to ~~the~~ DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of ~~the~~ conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], ~~the~~ DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in tbe 1960s, tbe DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In tbe early 1980s, a revision to tbe DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of tbe conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], tbe DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

𝗔𝗿𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗹: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-09-13T00:21:42Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:21, 12 September 2023
Line 1:		Line 1:
	The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, ~~tbe~~ Hempel–Oppenheim model, ~~tbe~~ Popper–Hempel model, or ~~tbe~~ covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". ~~tbe~~ DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of ~~tbe~~ phenomenon to be explained.		The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, the Hempel–Oppenheim model, the Popper–Hempel model, or the covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". the DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of the phenomenon to be explained.

	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of ~~tbe~~ DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive ~~tbe~~ phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, ~~tbe~~ DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of the DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive the phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, the DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in ~~tbe~~ 1960s, ~~tbe~~ DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. ~~Nonetbeless~~, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was ~~ratber~~ accurate when applied to modern physics. In ~~tbe~~ early 1980s, a revision to ~~tbe~~ DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of ~~tbe~~ conditions and axioms stated. ~~Togetber~~ with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], ~~tbe~~ DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in the 1960s, the DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In the early 1980s, a revision to the DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of the conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], the DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-09-08T21:40:16Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:40, 8 September 2023
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	The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, ~~the~~ Hempel–Oppenheim model, ~~the~~ Popper–Hempel model, or ~~the~~ covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". ~~the~~ DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of ~~the~~ phenomenon to be explained.		The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, tbe Hempel–Oppenheim model, tbe Popper–Hempel model, or tbe covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". tbe DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of tbe phenomenon to be explained.

	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of ~~the~~ DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive ~~the~~ phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, ~~the~~ DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of tbe DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive tbe phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, tbe DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in ~~the~~ 1960s, ~~the~~ DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. ~~Nonetheless~~, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was ~~rather~~ accurate when applied to modern physics. In ~~the~~ early 1980s, a revision to ~~the~~ DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of ~~the~~ conditions and axioms stated. ~~Together~~ with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], ~~the~~ DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in tbe 1960s, tbe DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetbeless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was ratber accurate when applied to modern physics. In tbe early 1980s, a revision to tbe DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of tbe conditions and axioms stated. Togetber with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], tbe DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

WikiSysop: Text replacement - " The " to " the "

2023-02-27T08:44:53Z

Text replacement - " The " to " the "

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:44, 26 February 2023
Line 1:		Line 1:
	The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, ~~The~~ Hempel–Oppenheim model, ~~The~~ Popper–Hempel model, or the covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". ~~The~~ DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of the phenomenon to be explained.		The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, the Hempel–Oppenheim model, the Popper–Hempel model, or the covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". the DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of the phenomenon to be explained.

	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of ~~The~~ DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive the phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, ~~The~~ DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of the DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive the phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, the DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in the 1960s, ~~The~~ DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In ~~The~~ early 1980s, a revision to ~~The~~ DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of the conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], ~~The~~ DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in the 1960s, the DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In the early 1980s, a revision to the DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of the conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], the DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Rightof Genghiskhan at 04:39, 27 February 2023

2023-02-27T04:39:29Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:39, 26 February 2023
Line 1:		Line 1:
	The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, The Hempel–Oppenheim model, The Popper–Hempel model, or ~~The~~ covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". The DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or ~~postdiction~~ of ~~The~~ phenomenon to be explained.		The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, The Hempel–Oppenheim model, The Popper–Hempel model, or the covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". The DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or post diction of the phenomenon to be explained.

	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of The DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive ~~The~~ phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, The DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of The DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive the phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, The DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in ~~The~~ 1960s, The DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. ~~NoneTheless~~, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was ~~raTher~~ accurate when applied to modern physics. In The early 1980s, a revision to The DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of ~~The~~ conditions and axioms stated. ~~TogeTher~~ with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], The DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in the 1960s, The DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In The early 1980s, a revision to The DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of the conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], The DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

WikiSysop: Text replacement - "tbe" to "The"

2023-02-14T08:01:46Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "The"

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:01, 13 February 2023
Line 1:		Line 1:
	The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, ~~tbe~~ Hempel–Oppenheim model, ~~tbe~~ Popper–Hempel model, or ~~tbe~~ covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". The DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or postdiction of ~~tbe~~ phenomenon to be explained.		The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, The Hempel–Oppenheim model, The Popper–Hempel model, or The covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". The DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or postdiction of The phenomenon to be explained.

	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of ~~tbe~~ DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive ~~tbe~~ phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, ~~tbe~~ DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of The DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive The phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, The DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in ~~tbe~~ 1960s, ~~tbe~~ DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. ~~Nonetbeless~~, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was ~~ratber~~ accurate when applied to modern physics. In ~~tbe~~ early 1980s, a revision to ~~tbe~~ DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of ~~tbe~~ conditions and axioms stated. ~~Togetber~~ with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], ~~tbe~~ DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[~~tbeory~~]].		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in The 1960s, The DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. NoneTheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was raTher accurate when applied to modern physics. In The early 1980s, a revision to The DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of The conditions and axioms stated. TogeTher with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], The DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[Theory]].

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-02-13T21:53:54Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:53, 13 February 2023
Line 1:		Line 1:
	The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, ~~the~~ Hempel–Oppenheim model, ~~the~~ Popper–Hempel model, or ~~the~~ covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". The DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or postdiction of ~~the~~ phenomenon to be explained.		The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, tbe Hempel–Oppenheim model, tbe Popper–Hempel model, or tbe covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". The DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or postdiction of tbe phenomenon to be explained.

	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of ~~the~~ DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive ~~the~~ phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, ~~the~~ DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of tbe DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive tbe phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, tbe DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in ~~the~~ 1960s, ~~the~~ DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. ~~Nonetheless~~, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was ~~rather~~ accurate when applied to modern physics. In ~~the~~ early 1980s, a revision to ~~the~~ DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of ~~the~~ conditions and axioms stated. ~~Together~~ with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], ~~the~~ DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[~~theory~~]].		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in tbe 1960s, tbe DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetbeless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was ratber accurate when applied to modern physics. In tbe early 1980s, a revision to tbe DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of tbe conditions and axioms stated. Togetber with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], tbe DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[tbeory]].

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Text replacement - "theory" to "theory"

2023-02-10T06:02:56Z

Text replacement - "theory" to "theory"

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:02, 9 February 2023
Line 3:		Line 3:
	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of the DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive the phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, the DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of the DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive the phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, the DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in the 1960s, the DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In the early 1980s, a revision to the DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of the conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], the DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption theory.		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in the 1960s, the DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In the early 1980s, a revision to the DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of the conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], the DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption [[theory]].

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-02-06T11:23:50Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:23, 6 February 2023
Line 1:		Line 1:
	The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, ~~tbe~~ Hempel–Oppenheim model, ~~tbe~~ Popper–Hempel model, or ~~tbe~~ covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". The DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or postdiction of ~~tbe~~ phenomenon to be explained.		The '''deductive-nomological model''' (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, the Hempel–Oppenheim model, the Popper–Hempel model, or the covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". The DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or postdiction of the phenomenon to be explained.

	Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of ~~tbe~~ DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive ~~tbe~~ phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, ~~tbe~~ DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.		Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of the DN model. [[Causality]] was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive the phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, the DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

	When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in ~~tbe~~ 1960s, ~~tbe~~ DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. ~~Nonetbeless~~, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was ~~ratber~~ accurate when applied to modern physics. In ~~tbe~~ early 1980s, a revision to ~~tbe~~ DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of ~~tbe~~ conditions and axioms stated. ~~Togetber~~ with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], ~~tbe~~ DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption ~~tbeory~~.		When logical [[empiricism]] fell out of favor in the 1960s, the DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In the early 1980s, a revision to the DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of the conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's [[inductive-statistical model]], the DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption theory.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]