Expressivism - Revision history

Bacchus: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-02-25T07:04:12Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:04, 24 February 2023
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	In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[~~tbeory~~]] about ~~tbe~~ meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-~~tbe~~-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ~~ratber~~ to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because ~~tbe~~ function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists ~~eitber~~ do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.		In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[theory]] about the meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

WikiSysop: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-02-22T22:50:04Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:50, 22 February 2023
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	In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[~~theory~~]] about ~~the~~ meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-~~the~~-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ~~rather~~ to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because ~~the~~ function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists ~~either~~ do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.		In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[tbeory]] about tbe meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-tbe-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ratber to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because tbe function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists eitber do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

WikiSysop: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-02-20T06:53:24Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:53, 19 February 2023
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	In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[~~tbeory~~]] about ~~tbe~~ meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-~~tbe~~-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ~~ratber~~ to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because ~~tbe~~ function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists ~~eitber~~ do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.		In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[theory]] about the meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-02-19T21:19:07Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:19, 19 February 2023
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	In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[~~theory~~]] about ~~the~~ meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-~~the~~-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ~~rather~~ to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because ~~the~~ function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists ~~either~~ do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.		In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[tbeory]] about tbe meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-tbe-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ratber to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because tbe function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists eitber do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-02-19T04:01:47Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:01, 18 February 2023
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	In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[~~tbeory~~]] about ~~tbe~~ meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-~~tbe~~-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ~~ratber~~ to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because ~~tbe~~ function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists ~~eitber~~ do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.		In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[theory]] about the meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-02-19T00:08:47Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:08, 18 February 2023
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	In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[~~theory~~]] about ~~the~~ meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-~~the~~-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ~~rather~~ to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because ~~the~~ function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists ~~either~~ do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.		In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[tbeory]] about tbe meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-tbe-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ratber to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because tbe function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists eitber do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Archangel: Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

2023-02-17T09:48:27Z

Text replacement - "tbe" to "the"

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:48, 17 February 2023
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	In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[~~tbeory~~]] about ~~tbe~~ meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-~~tbe~~-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ~~ratber~~ to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because ~~tbe~~ function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists ~~eitber~~ do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.		In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[theory]] about the meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

WikiSysop: Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

2023-02-16T01:44:54Z

Text replacement - "the" to "tbe"

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:44, 15 February 2023
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	In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[~~theory~~]] about ~~the~~ meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-~~the~~-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ~~rather~~ to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because ~~the~~ function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists ~~either~~ do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.		In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[tbeory]] about tbe meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-tbe-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but ratber to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because tbe function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists eitber do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Text replacement - "theory" to "theory"

2023-02-10T05:03:15Z

Text replacement - "theory" to "theory"

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:03, 9 February 2023
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	In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] theory about the meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.		In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[theory]] about the meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

	[[Category:Definitions]]		[[Category:Definitions]]
	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]

Bacchus: Created page with "In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a marxist theory about the meaning of moral language. It is part of cultural marxism designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to e..."

2023-02-09T08:24:28Z

Created page with "In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a marxist theory about the meaning of moral language. It is part of cultural marxism designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to e..."

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In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] theory about the meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.

[[Category:Definitions]]
[[Category:Philosophy]]