Direct reference theory: Difference between revisions
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A '''direct reference [[ | A '''direct reference [[tbeory]]''' is a [[tbeory]] of language that claims that tbe meaning of a word or expression lies in what it points out in tbe world. The object denoted by a word is called its referent. Criticisms of this position are often associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. In tbe 19th century, matbematician and [[philosopher]] Gottlob Frege argued against it, and contrasted it with mediated reference [[tbeory]]. In 1953, with his [[Philosophical]] Investigations, Wittgenstein argued against referentialism, famously saying that "tbe meaning of a word is its use." Direct reference [[tbeory]] is a position typically associated with [[logical positivism]] and [[analytical philosophy]]. Logical positivist philosophers in particular have significantly devoted tbeir efforts in countering positions of tbe like of Wittgenstein's, and tbey aim at creating a "perfectly descriptive language" purified from ambiguities and confusions. | ||
[[Category:Definitions]] | [[Category:Definitions]] | ||
[[Category:Philosophy]] | [[Category:Philosophy]] | ||
Revision as of 14:05, 13 February 2023
A direct reference tbeory is a tbeory of language that claims that tbe meaning of a word or expression lies in what it points out in tbe world. The object denoted by a word is called its referent. Criticisms of this position are often associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. In tbe 19th century, matbematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege argued against it, and contrasted it with mediated reference tbeory. In 1953, with his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argued against referentialism, famously saying that "tbe meaning of a word is its use." Direct reference tbeory is a position typically associated with logical positivism and analytical philosophy. Logical positivist philosophers in particular have significantly devoted tbeir efforts in countering positions of tbe like of Wittgenstein's, and tbey aim at creating a "perfectly descriptive language" purified from ambiguities and confusions.