Scientific realism: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
(Created page with "'''Scientific realism''' is the view that the universe described by science is real regardless of how it may be interpreted. Within philosophy of science, the discussion on the success of science centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities (theories such as evolution, quantum physics, even ghosts and spirits, or anything unobservable) spoken about by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims...") |
m (Text replacement - "science" to "Science Category:Science") |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
'''Scientific realism''' is the view that the universe described by | '''Scientific realism''' is the view that the universe described by Science [[Category:Science]] is real regardless of how it may be interpreted. | ||
Within [[philosophy of | Within [[philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]]]], the discussion on the success of Science [[Category:Science]] centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities (theories such as evolution, quantum physics, even ghosts and spirits, or anything unobservable) spoken about by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables, as opposed to [[instrumentalism]]. | ||
[[Category:Definitions]] | [[Category:Definitions]] | ||
[[Category:Philosophy]] | [[Category:Philosophy]] | ||
Revision as of 20:33, 13 February 2023
Scientific realism is the view that the universe described by Science is real regardless of how it may be interpreted.
Within [[philosophy of Science]], the discussion on the success of Science centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities (theories such as evolution, quantum physics, even ghosts and spirits, or anything unobservable) spoken about by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables, as opposed to instrumentalism.