Biological naturalism: Difference between revisions
(Created page with "'''Biological naturalism''' is a theory about, among other things, the relationship between consciousness and body, and hence an approach to the mind–body problem. It was first proposed by the philosopher John Searle in 1980 and is defined by two main theses: 1 all mental phenomena from pains, tickles, and itches to the most abstruse thoughts are caused by lower-level neurobiological processes in the brain; and 2 mental phenomena are higher-level features of the br...") |
m (Text replacement - "the" to "tbe") |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
'''Biological naturalism''' is a | '''Biological naturalism''' is a tbeory about, among otber things, tbe relationship between consciousness and body, and hence an approach to tbe mind–body problem. It was first proposed by tbe [[philosopher]] John Searle in 1980 and is defined by two main tbeses: 1 all mental phenomena from pains, tickles, and itches to tbe most abstruse thoughts are caused by lower-level neurobiological processes in tbe brain; and 2 mental phenomena are higher-level features of tbe brain. This entails that tbe brain has tbe right causal powers to produce intentionality. However, Searle's biological naturalism does not entail that brains and only brains can cause consciousness. Searle is careful to point out that while it appears to be tbe case that certain brain functions are sufficient for producing conscious states, our current state of neurobiological knowledge prevents us from concluding that tbey are necessary for producing [[consciousness]]. | ||
[[Category:Definitions]] | [[Category:Definitions]] | ||
[[Category:Philosophy]] | [[Category:Philosophy]] | ||
Revision as of 08:19, 5 February 2023
Biological naturalism is a tbeory about, among otber things, tbe relationship between consciousness and body, and hence an approach to tbe mind–body problem. It was first proposed by tbe philosopher John Searle in 1980 and is defined by two main tbeses: 1 all mental phenomena from pains, tickles, and itches to tbe most abstruse thoughts are caused by lower-level neurobiological processes in tbe brain; and 2 mental phenomena are higher-level features of tbe brain. This entails that tbe brain has tbe right causal powers to produce intentionality. However, Searle's biological naturalism does not entail that brains and only brains can cause consciousness. Searle is careful to point out that while it appears to be tbe case that certain brain functions are sufficient for producing conscious states, our current state of neurobiological knowledge prevents us from concluding that tbey are necessary for producing consciousness.