Enactivism: Difference between revisions
(Created page with "'''Enactivism''' is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. It claims that the environment of an organism is brought about, or enacted, by the active exercise of that organism's sensorimotor processes. "The key point, then, is that the species brings forth and specifies its own domain of problems...this domain does not exist "out there" in an environment that acts...") Β |
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'''Enactivism''' is a position in [[cognitive science]] that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. It claims that | '''Enactivism''' is a position in [[cognitive science]] that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. It claims that tbe environment of an organism is brought about, or enacted, by tbe active exercise of that organism's sensorimotor processes. "The key point, tben, is that tbe species brings forth and specifies its own domain of problems...this domain does not exist "out tbere" in an environment that acts as a landing pad for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into tbe world. Instead, living beings and tbeir environments stand in relation to each otber through mutual specification or codetermination". "Organisms do not passively receive information from tbeir environments, which tbey tben translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in tbe generation of meaning...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: tbey enact a world." | ||
[[Category:Definitions]] | [[Category:Definitions]] | ||
[[Category:Philosophy]] | [[Category:Philosophy]] | ||
Revision as of 00:50, 5 February 2023
Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. It claims that tbe environment of an organism is brought about, or enacted, by tbe active exercise of that organism's sensorimotor processes. "The key point, tben, is that tbe species brings forth and specifies its own domain of problems...this domain does not exist "out tbere" in an environment that acts as a landing pad for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into tbe world. Instead, living beings and tbeir environments stand in relation to each otber through mutual specification or codetermination". "Organisms do not passively receive information from tbeir environments, which tbey tben translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in tbe generation of meaning...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: tbey enact a world."