Confirmation holism: Difference between revisions
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In [[Philosophy of science|philosophy of science]], '''confirmation holism''', also called '''epistemological holism''', is | In [[Philosophy of science|philosophy of science]], '''confirmation holism''', also called '''epistemological holism''', is the view that no individual statement can be confirmed or disconfirmed by an empirical test, but rather that only a set of statements (a whole theory) can be so. It is attributed to Willard Van Orman Quine who motivated his holism through extending Pierre Duhem's problem of [[underdetermination]] in physical theory to all knowledge claims. <ref name="online text">W. V. O. Quine. '[[Philosophy:Two Dogmas of Empiricism|Two Dogmas of Empiricism]].' ''The Philosophical Review'', 60 (1951), pp. 20–43. [http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html online text]</ref><ref>Duhem, Pierre. ''The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory''. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1954.</ref> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 02:37, 6 February 2023
In philosophy of science, confirmation holism, also called epistemological holism, is the view that no individual statement can be confirmed or disconfirmed by an empirical test, but rather that only a set of statements (a whole theory) can be so. It is attributed to Willard Van Orman Quine who motivated his holism through extending Pierre Duhem's problem of underdetermination in physical theory to all knowledge claims. [1][2]
References
- ↑ W. V. O. Quine. 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism.' The Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), pp. 20–43. online text
- ↑ Duhem, Pierre. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1954.