Moral realism: Difference between revisions
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(Created page with "'''Moral realism''' is the philosophical doctrine that moral claims are cognitive claims that are at least sometimes true. Moral realism, therefore, contrasts with non-cognitivism (which variously holds that moral claims are prescriptions, commands, or expressions of one's emotions, affective disposition, or acceptance of norms) and "error-theories" of morality (which hold that moral claims are indeed cognitive, but are all completely mistaken). Some moral realis...") Β |
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'''Moral realism''' is the [[philosophical]] doctrine that moral claims are cognitive claims that are at least sometimes true. Moral realism, therefore, contrasts with [[non-cognitivism]] (which variously holds that moral claims are prescriptions, commands, or expressions of one's emotions, affective disposition, or acceptance of norms) and "error-theories" of morality (which hold that moral claims are indeed cognitive | '''Moral realism''' is the [[philosophical]] doctrine that moral claims are cognitive claims that are at least sometimes true. Moral realism, therefore, contrasts with [[non-cognitivism]] (which variously holds that moral claims are prescriptions, commands, or expressions of one's emotions, affective disposition, or acceptance of norms) and "error-theories" of morality (which hold that moral claims are indeed cognitive but are all completely mistaken). Some moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Smith, and Thomas Nagel. | ||
[[Category:Philosophy]] | [[Category:Philosophy]] | ||
Latest revision as of 20:25, 2 April 2023
Moral realism is the philosophical doctrine that moral claims are cognitive claims that are at least sometimes true. Moral realism, therefore, contrasts with non-cognitivism (which variously holds that moral claims are prescriptions, commands, or expressions of one's emotions, affective disposition, or acceptance of norms) and "error-theories" of morality (which hold that moral claims are indeed cognitive but are all completely mistaken). Some moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Smith, and Thomas Nagel.