Confirmation holism: Difference between revisions

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In [[Philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]]|philosophy of Science [[Category:Science]], '''confirmation holism''', also called '''epistemological holism''', is the view that no individual statement can be confirmed or disconfirmed by an empirical test, but raTher that only a set of statements (a whole [[Theory]]) can be so. It is attributed to Willard Van Orman Quine who motivated his holism through extending Pierre Duhem's problem of [[underdetermination]] in physical [[Theory]] to all knowledge claims. <ref name="online text">W. V. O. Quine. '[[Philosophy:Two Dogmas of Empiricism|Two Dogmas of Empiricism]].' ''The Philosophical Review'', 60 (1951), pp. 20โ€“43. [http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html online text]</ref><ref>Duhem, Pierre. ''The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory''. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1954.</ref>
In [[Philosophy of Scienceย  in physical [[Theory]] to all knowledge claims. <ref name="online text">W. V. O. Quine. '[[Philosophy:Two Dogmas of Empiricism|Two Dogmas of Empiricism]].' ''The Philosophical Review'', 60 (1951), pp. 20โ€“43. [http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html online text]</ref><ref>Duhem, Pierre. ''The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory''. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1954.</ref>


==References==
==References==

Latest revision as of 17:07, 19 February 2024

In [[Philosophy of Science in physical Theory to all knowledge claims. [1][2]

References

  1. โ†‘ W. V. O. Quine. 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism.' The Philosophical Review, 60 (1951), pp. 20โ€“43. online text
  2. โ†‘ Duhem, Pierre. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1954.
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