Philosophy of science: Difference between revisions
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While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref> | While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], general philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.<ref>Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.</ref> | ||
Subsequently, the [[Coherentism|coherentist]] approach to science, in which a theory is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience. | Subsequently, the [[Coherentism|coherentist]] approach to science, in which a [[theory]] is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology|knowledge is created]] from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience. | ||
A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific theory can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of science also arise with greater specificity in some particular sciences. The question of what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social sciences explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations. | A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific [[theory]] can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Philosophy:Reductionism|reduced]] to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of science also arise with greater specificity in some particular sciences. The question of what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social sciences explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations. | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 18:44, 9 February 2023
Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy concerned with the foundations, methods, and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose of science. This discipline overlaps with metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and truth. Philosophy of science focuses on metaphysical, epistemic and semantic aspects of science. Ethical issues such as bioethics and scientific misconduct are often considered ethics or science studies rather than the philosophy of science.
Consensus
There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of science, including whether science can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about science as a whole, philosophers of science consider problems that apply to particular sciences (such as biology or physics). Some philosophers of science also use contemporary results in science to reach conclusions about philosophy itself.
While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of Aristotle, general philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivist movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. Charles Sanders Peirce and Karl Popper moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was also formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead of arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.[1]
Subsequently, the coherentist approach to science, in which a theory is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others. Some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, and Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "scientific method", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones. Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how knowledge is created from a sociological perspective. Finally, a tradition in continental philosophy approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.
A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific theory can be intra- or intertheoretically reduced to the terms of another. That is, if chemistry can be reduced to physics, or if sociology can be reduced to individual psychology. The general questions of philosophy of science also arise with greater specificity in some particular sciences. The question of what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the social sciences explore whether the scientific studies of human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by values and by social relations.
References
- ↑ Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/Thomas-S-Kuhn, Thomas S. Kuhn archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20150417031348/http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/324460/Thomas-S-Kuhn: Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important.