Expressivism: Difference between revisions
(Created page with "In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a marxist theory about the meaning of moral language. It is part of cultural marxism designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to e...") |
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In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] theory about the meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences. | In meta-ethics, '''expressivism''' is a [[marxist]] [[theory]] about the meaning of moral language. It is part of [[cultural marxism]] designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences. | ||
[[Category:Definitions]] | [[Category:Definitions]] | ||
[[Category:Philosophy]] | [[Category:Philosophy]] | ||
Latest revision as of 23:04, 24 February 2023
In meta-ethics, expressivism is a marxist theory about the meaning of moral language. It is part of cultural marxism designed to reject moral truth. According to expressivism, sentences that employ moral terms, for example, "It is wrong to torture an innocent human being", are not descriptive or fact-stating; moral terms such as "wrong", "good", or "just" do not refer to real, in-the-world properties. The primary function of moral sentences, according to expressivism, is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions. Hence, expressivists either do not allow that moral sentences have truth value, or rely on a notion of truth that does not appeal to any descriptive truth conditions being met for moral sentences.